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The question of why the international community continually fails to prevent genocide remains an
ever-present concern. Genocide scholars question how the political will of the politically unwilling
remains unaltered by the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. However, it appears that little consider-
ation has been given to the fact that genocide is open to interpretation. By this I mean that all scho-
lars and policy makers have a view of the world which shapes their understanding of genocide
within it. This is important because it helps explain why actors at the international level perceive
genocide prevention in a radically different light from one another. With this in mind, the article
uses the concepts of an international system, an international society, and an international com-
munity to demonstrate how one’s worldview has implications on how one understands genocide.
These three perspectives help underline the complexities involved as genocide prevention remains
dependent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.
Key words: genocide prevention, international system, realism, international society, the English
School, international community, cosmopolitanism
This article incorporates the concept of genocide into Martin Wight’s “three tradi-
tions” framework in order to put forward a realist–international system, a rationalist–
international society, and a cosmopolitan–international community perspective on
genocide in international relations (IR).1 The value of this approach is that it enables a
three-way dialogue to be forged between competing worldviews that highlights how the
assumptions embodied within one’s view of international relations shapes one’s under-
standing of issues such as justice, power, and, in this context, genocide. The utility of
Wight’s approach has seen an upsurge in the three traditions literature over the past
two decades as scholars have sought to analyze issues such as humanitarian interven-
tion, globalization, and the security dilemma within this tripartite framework.2 To date,
there has not been a single article published which analyzes genocide within the context
of the three traditions. Accordingly, this article addresses this lacuna and, in so doing,
demonstrates how alternative worldviews shape perceptions, interpretations, and un-
derstandings of genocide. This is not to suggest that other factors—from the psychologi-
cal mindset of a leader to the grand strategy of a state—do not also play a role in
shaping perceptions, but that at present the discourse tends to overlook the implications
of competing worldviews for the issue of genocide prevention.
To put the issue of rival worldviews into context, let us consider a recent debate in
the Journal of Genocide Research between Linda Melvern and Stephen Wertheim over
whether the Rwandan Genocide could have been prevented.3 While many issues were
raised, of speciﬁc interest here is Melvern’s claim that the 2,500 UN peacekeepers in
Kenya, 250 US Rangers in Burundi, 800 French troops in the region, and “80 Italians
everywhere!” (to use Wertheim’s phrase4) among others, could and therefore should
have been brought together in order to prevent the Rwandan Genocide or at least
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minimize its destruction.5 Opposing this view, Wertheim claims that while possible, this
was not plausible.6 The point here is not to judge whether Melvern or Wertheim is right
as that would take an entire article in itself. Rather, the aim is to simply highlight that
each perspective embodies a different worldview regarding the potential for cooperation
between states.7 From an IR perspective, Melvern seemingly upholds a normative
approach which posits that since states could have cooperated, they should have, and
thus by “pooling” their resources, states could have prevented the Rwandan Genocide.8
On the other hand, Wertheim’s focus on what is plausible rather than possible reveals a
realist approach which stresses the inherent difﬁculties of cooperation in an anarchical
realm (though Wertheim is sympathetic to the idea that the US could have supported
the Rwandan Patriotic Front).9 Notably, this example illustrates that the debates that
emerge between genocide scholars do not necessarily stem from alternative views of
genocide (both Melvern and Wertheim wanted the Rwandan Genocide to be prevented)
but instead stem from different worldviews.
Problematically, these worldviews are rarely acknowledged within the discourse.
Until this is taken into account, my fear is that scholars and policy makers will continue
to talk past one another rather than to each other. By this I mean that because a dia-
logue is created on a single subject matter—in this case, genocide—the actors involved
assume they are talking about the same thing, whereas in fact, they have a fundamen-
tally different understanding of genocide prevention that stems from their worldview.
While such thinking is increasingly accepted in political science,10 this remains an un-
explored theme in genocide studies.11 Addressing this lacuna, this article incorporates
genocide into the three traditions framework in order to illustrate how one’s worldview
shapes one’s understanding of genocide within it. The hope is that through deconstruct-
ing alternative worldviews on genocide we can generate valuable insight into how a
more fruitful dialogue that aids the prevention of genocide can be constructed.
To do this, the article is structured in a fourfold format. The ﬁrst section presents a
brief overview of the three traditions in order to explain what is meant by an interna-
tional system, an international society, and an international community perspective.
This provides the groundwork for the following three sections, which put forward more
in-depth analyses of each outlook to reveal how the assumptions embodied in each
worldview have implications on genocide prevention. This is something that needs to
be considered carefully within the discipline of genocide studies.
The Three Traditions
It was in the 1950s that Martin Wight ﬁrst identiﬁed the three traditions of realism,
rationalism, and revolutionism as a teaching tool to help students navigate the realist–
idealist dichotomy that dominated the discipline of IR in the interwar period.12 As An-
drew Linklater explains, “In his lectures, Wight lamented the way in which debates
between realism and utopianism in the interwar years had neglected the via media with
its distinct focus on international society.”13 For Wight, there was middle ground to be
found between the overt pessimism embodied in realism and the overt optimism embo-
died in what he labeled revolutionism. Responding to this neglected middle ground,
Wight brought the rationalist tradition (which he associated with Hugo Grotius), back
into his analysis of international theory. In so doing, Wight developed a threefold ana-
lytical framework that, as I have stated, has undergone a revival since it was published
posthumously in 1991. Accordingly, this article incorporates the concept of genocide
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into this threefold framework to help shed insight into understanding genocide in inter-
national relations.
As stated, Linklater uses Martin Wight’s three traditions to equate the tradition of
realism with the more pessimistic idea of an international system, the tradition of ratio-
nalism with the idea of an international society, and the tradition of revolutionism with
the more optimistic idea of an international community.15 Understandably, for those
not familiar with IR theory, this overview may seem somewhat alien. Thus, in Figure 1
I attempt to bring the Linklater–Wight juxtaposition to life in order to help illustrate
the three alternative worldviews prior to integrating the concept of genocide.
It is important to take note of three caveats prior to continuing. First, the spectrum
falls foul of failing to recognize “discontinuities of thought”16 and exclusions of thought,
such as gender.17 Second, Wight himself feared that reiﬁcation would only further sim-
plify and distort the three concepts which he himself never published.18 While both
these points are valid, it seems that the discipline of IR has always been plagued by the
problem of classiﬁcation. Scholars use frames, labels, ﬁgures, and models as ways of il-
lustrating the complexities involved. The reality is that if we did not categorize the his-
tory of ideas, we would be left bewildered. What is important, then, is that scholars
remain aware of the limitations involved while continuing to explain their position as
clearly as they can. A third and ﬁnal caveat is that Wight stressed that “the three tradi-
tions are not like three railroad tracks running parallel into inﬁnity. . . . The three tradi-
tions are streams, with eddies and crosscurrents, sometimes interlacing and never for
long conﬁned to their own riverbed.”19 This statement neatly captures the idea of
blurred boundaries and underlines the notion that realism, rationalism, and revolution-
ism should not be viewed as three separate pillars.
Figure 1 simply aims to illustrate that the three traditions of realism, rationalism,
and revolutionism represent different and competing worldviews. This is important
because one can see that one’s position on this spectrum consequently holds implica-
tions for how one understands genocide prevention in international relations just as it
would with any other concept, such as war, sovereignty, diplomacy, or justice. Each tra-
dition embodies assumptions, and understanding these helps reveal how one’s view of
Figure 1 An overview of the Linklater–Wight juxtaposition14
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the world shapes one’s view of genocide prevention within it. To consider this further,
let us ﬁrst address the tradition of realism and the idea of an international system.
International System: Realism
Critics often portray realism in an overly simplistic and crude manner, which in turn al-
lows them to dismiss realism, or at least their representation of realism, with ease.20
This is not to suggest that realism does not have its problems, but to acknowledge at the
outset that realism does offer insight into understanding international relations.21 Per-
haps Barry Buzan summarized this position best in “The Timeless Wisdom of Real-
ism?,” where he essentially concludes that realism offers us wisdom, but not timeless
wisdom.22 From this perspective, realism offers insight into the complexities of interna-
tional relations, but it fails in its attempt to provide objective knowledge claims that are
applicable across both time and space. However, the dominance of realism in policy
making remains unavoidable: “From 1939 to the present, leading theorists and policy
makers have continued to view the world through realist lenses.”23 It is therefore impor-
tant to engage with realism for it helps explain why policy makers give low political pri-
ority to the issue of genocide prevention.
To return to Linklater’s analysis, he equates the tradition of realism with the idea of
an international system: “The Hobbesian or Machiavellian perspective represents the
anti-progressivist approach to international relations which contends that states belong
to an international system in which there is seldom relief from competition and con-
ﬂict.”24 The statement encapsulates the skepticism embodied in the realist view of inter-
national relations. Unlike English School scholars—who champion the idea of an
international society—realists tend to see a world of international instability rather than
international order. The origins of this instability are traced back to the anarchical
structure (neorealism) or human nature (classical realism).25 With no world govern-
ment to constrain the conditions of anarchy or human nature, states remain embroiled
in a never-ending competition for power, security, and survival. Essentially, states are
locked into this international system of competition and conﬂict which prevents any
potential for progress toward an international society or international community.
To put this logic into the context of genocide studies let us consider Alex Alvarez’s
work Governments, Citizens and Genocide, in which the author explains that diplomats
“are often held hostage to Realpolitik strategies that place a higher value on protecting
national security than protecting an oppressed group.” 26 The prioritization of national
security dictates that the prevention of genocide and mass violence is given little politi-
cal priority. For instance, in 1975, prior to the Indonesian oppression in East Timor, the
Australian ambassador to Indonesia wrote that Australia should assume a “pragmatic
rather than a principled stand,” because “that is what national interest and foreign pol-
icy is all about.”27 Echoing such sentiment, James Wood, a US deputy assistant secretary
of defense, placed Rwanda–Burundi on a list of potential trouble spots only to be
informed by a superior: “Take it off the list. . . US national interest is not involved . . .
we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the
Middle East and North Korea and so on.”28 Similarly, as Slobodan Milošević engineered
a process of destruction and dispossession in the former Yugoslavia, George Bush’s sec-
retary of state James Baker repeatedly stated, “We don’t have a dog in this ﬁght.”29 The
attitude expressed through these statements underlines the central point that genocide
prevention is not considered to be in a state’s national interest. Because of this, policy
makers view genocide prevention as somewhat altruistic and part of an unrealistic
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foreign policy agenda. It is important to consider, however, that this does not necessarily
represent an amoral or immoral position, even though it is obviously a highly conten-
tious issue.30
Although realists would like to live in a world without problems such as genocide,
they do not see how such problems can be resolved without the establishment of a
world government. To go back to the aforementioned debate over the potential for
cooperation between states, realists argue that international institutions such as the
United Nations do not have the power to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on
interstate cooperation.”31 In other words, because there is no world government, states
operate within a climate of mistrust and fear (the security dilemma32). This zero-sum
environment dictates that state x will only cooperate with state y if state x perceives that
it will gain more out of the agreement than state y (and vice versa); for realists, this ex-
plains why there is so little cooperation at the international level. This represents a rela-
tive gains approach as opposed to an absolute gains approach which is upheld by those
that favor the idea of an international society. Such understanding helps explain why
realists view genocide as just another insoluble problem as they reject the so-called ide-
alistic belief that “no problems—however hopeless they may appear to be—are really
insoluble, given well-meaning, well-ﬁnanced, and competent efforts.”33 In sum, realists
do not credit institutions such as the UN with any real power to help foster cooperation
between states which, when juxtaposed with the fact that there is no world government,
dictates that there is no functioning collective security system to address problems such
as genocide.
Moreover, without a world government or a functioning collective security system,
realists remain fearful of states getting involved in altruistic moral crusades. Thus, a
normative argument emerges as realists claim that “the path of justice and honour in-
volves one in danger.”34 In other words, genocide prevention is a classic example of
moral overreach, for as Morgenthau succinctly stated, while the individual has the right
to say, “Let justice be done, even if the world perish,” the state does not have the right
to say this on its citizens’ behalf.35 Since realists reject the idea that states have a moral
obligation to anyone other than their own citizens, they have tended to view interna-
tional normative developments such as the 1948 United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) as humanitarian con-
cerns that are of little real concern to a state’s national interests. From this perspective
states should not send—or let the UN send—their “sons and daughters” to die “saving
strangers.”36 In addition to this, realists claim that so-called humanitarian intervention
is nothing more than a “Trojan horse.”37 Political elites may speak with a moral tongue
when intervening in a certain state but they pursue ulterior motives. Thus, a secondary
moral argument arises as realists claim that state sovereignty and nonintervention help
protect weaker countries from the imperialistic agendas of more powerful ones. Accord-
ingly, this realist framework embodies a moral rationale.
For realists, whether right or wrong, humankind has divided itself up into states. It
is therefore unrealistic to ignore the reality that policy makers create policy on behalf of
states rather than on behalf of humankind. Yet as shall be discussed below, this is pre-
cisely what cosmopolitans advocate. Realists claim that when states do cooperate, they
do so only to further the national interest. For example, long-term collective security
strategies are adopted when attempting to prevent crimes such as nuclear proliferation,
international terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, and piracy at the international level.38 Using
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realist logic, it would seem that policy makers perceive that such crimes outstrip the
individual security capacity of states who then work collectively to address this security
deﬁcit. Accordingly, the collective interest furthers the national interest within such spe-
ciﬁc contexts. The fact that there is no long-term collective security strategy regarding
genocide reﬂects that policy makers do not perceive genocide as posing an international
threat. Such understanding only goes to restate the point that when it comes to geno-
cide prevention, policy makers do not perceive that they have a “dog in the ﬁght” and
in turn do not treat the prevention of genocide as a matter of national interest.
Prior to highlighting the counter-perspectives put forward by English School scho-
lars (international society) and cosmopolitans (international community) it is impor-
tant to stress that further interdisciplinary research needs to be done. For example,
realists have to consider whether their view of genocide stems from their understanding
of human nature, cooperation, national interest, anarchical structure—a mix of these—
or, more importantly, genocide itself.39 By this I mean that despite their having a pessi-
mistic view of human nature, a narrow understanding of national interest, a relative
gains approach toward cooperation, and/or a neorealist belief that the anarchical system
can push states to behave in certain ways, realists do accept that on certain issues states
do cooperate within the anarchical realm. This acceptance of cooperation is important
because it highlights that the realist view—that genocide prevention is not within the
national interest of states—stems not from their view of cooperation, human nature,
and so forth, but their view of genocide. In other words, realists do not believe that
genocide poses a security threat to states. It is this perception of genocide, therefore,
that drives realists to claim that states should not engage in genocide prevention unless
there are matters of national interest at stake. However, a problem arises as realists have
not spent any signiﬁcant amount of time questioning whether genocide does in fact
have an impact on international order. Simply speaking, they have a view of genocide
but have not actually studied genocide in any great detail. This brings us back to the ar-
ticle’s opening claim that more interdisciplinary research on the relationship between
one’s worldview and one’s understanding of genocide within it is needed.
At present, it appears that the realist view of genocide is built on a set of under-
theorized assumptions. This was put into perfect context in the aftermath of the Rwan-
dan Genocide as hard-line realist Henry Kissinger stated,
At least in Bosnia we did something—maybe too late—but in Rwanda hundreds of
thousands were killed. [Rwanda] is not a country of strategic importance for the
United States; you cannot deﬁne a national interest that would take us there. And
yet, there, I tend to think I personally would have supported an intervention. It
would have been a violation of what ordinarily is my principle. Ordinarily I feel
that you should not risk American lives for objectives where you cannot explain to
the mothers why you did it. . . . [Yet] my instinct tells me we should have done it in
Rwanda.40
The statement neatly captures much of the rationale set out above as Kissinger
highlights that states should only engage in complex foreign policy matters when there
are national interests at stake. From a moral perspective, the prioritization of the
national interest is justiﬁed on the grounds that the lives of citizens should not be risked
for anything other than national security. While one could raise the point that many
grieving mothers may accept genocide prevention as a “just cause,” the interesting point
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is that Kissinger favors intervention even though it violates his ordinary principle (by
which he means the assumptions set out above). Kissinger’s omission is very interesting
for the following concluding point: if realists accept that they may be willing to violate
their ordinary principles when it comes to genocide prevention, then is it not time that
realists reformulate their ordinary principles so that they did not have to violate them
in the ﬁrst place?41 Otherwise, realism provides us with a theory of international rela-
tions except at those times when genocide is occurring, which notably undermines the
entire premise of so-called realism. Therefore, it is worth considering that realists do
not hold a monopoly over interpreting reality, which naturally leads us to the two alter-
native perspectives discussed below.
In sum, realists ask us to consider the tragedy that lies at the heart of international
relations.42 This tragedy stems from the fact that there is no world government to con-
strain human nature (classical realism) or mitigate the impact of the anarchical struc-
ture (neorealism). Because of these factors, genocide represents an insoluble problem;
furthermore, genocide prevention represents an altruistic and dangerous foreign policy
agenda that states should not pursue unless there are vital national interests at stake.
Until a world government is formed, to think otherwise is simply unrealistic or utopian.
Yet of course, counterclaims can be made, which leads us to the international society
perspective as English School scholars claim that even without a world government
states can and do uphold legal, moral, and political agreements.
International Society: Rationalism
As stated, the English School approach to international relations—which Wight asso-
ciated with Hugo Grotius—is also known as the international society approach or the
rationalist approach.43 All three terms, therefore, are used interchangeably to refer to the
English School view that international society represents a via media between the interna-
tional system advocated by realists and the international community advocated by cos-
mopolitans (to be discussed below). While the English School’s focus on the state and the
role of power within international relations has sometimes seen critics label it “realism in
drag,” as will be discussed, the idea that states have formed a society rather than a system
demonstrates a fundamentally different interpretation of international relations, which
holds signiﬁcant implications for how English School scholars view genocide.44
To ﬂesh out this idea of an international society let us return to Linklater, who
summarizes the meaning of this society approach:
The Grotian tradition occupies the intermediate position since it believes there has
been qualiﬁed progress in world politics exempliﬁed by the existence of a society of
states which places constraints on the state’s power to hurt and facilitates interna-
tional cooperation. States in this condition are orientated towards communicative
action—to participation in diplomatic dialogues in which they advance claims and
counterclaims with a view of establishing global standards of legitimacy which dis-
tinguish between permissible and proscribed behavior.45
The statement encapsulates the spirit of the international society approach as
English School scholars believe that although societal relations have developed beyond
that of an international system, they have not progressed, and indeed are unlikely to
progress, to the point of an international community. As a result, international society
represents the middle-ground position: there is more to international relations than the
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realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires.46 The idea of an international
society, therefore, stems from the belief that just as individuals at the domestic level cre-
ate societies based on the establishment of collective understandings, states create inter-
national societies by establishing what Linklater refers to as “global standards of
legitimacy.” These standards of legitimacy are expressed via the norms, values, princi-
ples, and institutions of international relations.47 It is claimed that these collective un-
derstandings enable and/or constrain the behavior of states, thereby increasing the
likelihood of order at the international level.48
From this perspective, the UNCG represents a normative reaction to the Nazi
atrocity which was later labeled genocide. By this I mean that the Nazi genocide acted as
a catalyst which altered international legal, moral, and political expectations, thus chan-
ging international society’s understanding of “rightful conduct.”49 For instance, Gareth
Evans explains that for 300 years the Westphalian principles that underpinned interna-
tional relations acted to “institutionalize indifference” in that political leaders were both
immune to external accountability and largely indifferent toward the suffering of others
within states.50 This is not to say that political elites never voiced concern over human
rights violations within other states.51 Events such as those in Armenia acted as notable
precursors for the changes made in the post-World War II era.52 The point is that the
pattern of institutionalized indifference was deemed to be morally and legally unaccep-
table in the aftermath of the Nazi genocide. From this perspective, international so-
ciety’s willingness to accept the term genocide and codify it into international law
reﬂected a new global standard of legitimacy. Furthermore, the Nazi genocide had
broader implications as it helped shape the discourse on universal human rights.53 Such
developments reinforce the English School belief that states form a society at the inter-
national level by creating collective institutions, rules, norms, values, and principles.
These reﬂect that international relations have progressed to the point that the interna-
tional system has become an international society.
At this point the genocide scholar may rightly point out that while the UNCG may
represent a global standard of legitimacy, so far, political elites have systematically failed
to meet the goals of the convention. Of course, English School scholars would not reject
this position for it is evident that states have failed to fulﬁll their legal and moral duties
to prevent genocide.54 Yet at the same time, one has to consider that since genocide pre-
vention may lead states to complex and dangerous foreign policies, fundamental pro-
blems arise from legal, moral, and political perspectives.55 Although English School
scholars want genocide prevention and favor the idea of collective preventative strate-
gies being forged, they also share some realist fears regarding humanitarian intervention
which they believe “exposes the conﬂict between order and justice at its starkest.”56 The
reason for their apprehension is that the debate over humanitarian intervention creates
tension between the fundamental principles that are seen to underpin both order (state
sovereignty) and justice (universal human rights) in international society. As is well
documented, the Charter of the United Nations embodies a dual commitment to both
state sovereignty and human rights.57 Although the latter took on a subordinate role in
1945,58 developments since have seen contemporary interpretations of the Charter
claim that both state sovereignty and human rights should be understood as ordering
principles within international society and that the former should be understood in the
conditional rather than the absolute sense as implied by the UNCG and the 2005 for-
malization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).59
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Notably, this has seen a division arise within the English School between pluralists
and solidarists. On the one hand, English School pluralists reject the idea that states can
legitimately intervene in other states’ internal affairs and uphold the rules of absolute
sovereignty and nonintervention on the grounds that these rules help serve interna-
tional order.60 From this perspective, humanitarian intervention acts as a crime against
humanity (in a non-legal manner) as it violates the very rules that serve humanity
best.61 On the other hand, English School solidarists claim that sovereignty should be
understood as conditional, human rights as universal, and humanitarian intervention as
legitimate if they bring an end to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide.62 Critically,
both sets of scholars appeal to different empirical developments in their attempts
to legitimate their own set of rules. For example, pluralists invoke the UN Charter—
especially Article 2 (7)—to claim that sovereignty should be interpreted as absolute.63
Solidarists advocate subsequent developments such as the adoption of the UNCG and
R2P in order to demonstrate that sovereignty should be interpreted as conditional.
While an assessment of these claims cannot be put forward here,64 the division within
this one school of thought succinctly illustrates the magnitude of the task at hand, as
international society has been constructed upon fundamentally opposing ordering prin-
ciples. Genocide prevention will remain entrenched in a legal and political quagmire
until what Ian Clark refers to as a “tolerable consensus” has been forged between rele-
vant actors at the international level.65
A ﬁnal point worth considering within this analysis of international society is the
faith that English School scholars place in the idea of an international society. Indeed it
may seem somewhat paradoxical to highlight the moral deﬁciencies of international
society on the one hand but also uphold a commitment to international society on the
other. This brings us naturally to the criticism that the English School is state-centric in
nature. How can it stress the moral imperfections of the state system yet remain com-
mitted to a state-centric approach? This is perhaps best illustrated in Paul Keal’s accom-
plished study, in which he highlights that the laws and ideas embodied within the
expansion of international society led it to be constructed on the dispossession of indig-
enous lands, the dehumanization of indigenous peoples, and ultimately genocide.66
From this perspective, the historical evolution of international society should be under-
stood as “morally backward.”67 However, despite Keal accepting this, he upholds an
English School approach for he claims that international society remains the most
appropriate vehicle for moral progress within contemporary international relations.68
In other words, English School scholars accept that states have committed atrocities in
the past and will no doubt commit them in the future, but to suggest that an alternative
non-state framework can be constructed is a fallacy. Again, it may be possible, but not
plausible. As Andrew Hurrell succinctly explains, “The state can certainly be a major
part of the problem but remains an unavoidable part of the solution.”69
So where does this leave genocide, the UNCG, and genocide prevention from an
English School perspective? English School scholars would illustrate that although the
UNCG and R2P have laid some groundwork, much more has to be done to entrench
and institutionalize universal moral standards and implement exiting legal commit-
ments.70 International law will never cause states to act in a certain way, but it does
shape the behavior of states and most of the time states do uphold international legal
developments. The problem is that genocide prevention, as discussed, remains highly
problematic from a legal, moral, and political perspective. Therefore, English School
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scholars accept that normative developments will not come about quickly as an interna-
tional consensus needs to be forged in order to implement—not just agree upon—global
standards of legitimacy such as the UNCG. The fear is that just as international rela-
tions can progress, they can also regress, and the survival of international society re-
quires a consensus being forged over the basic principles of international order.71 In
essence, English School scholars uphold an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary
ethic as they seek to gradually improve international society rather than radically rede-
sign it. It is this latter aspect that this article now turns its attention toward.
International Community: Revolutionism
The tradition of revolutionism remains the most undertheorized tradition identiﬁed by
Martin Wight—at least from an English School perspective. For Wight, revolutionism
was a hybrid category which captured the “soft” revolutionaries from Kant to Nehru, as
well as the “hard” revolutionaries of Jacobins and Marxists.72 While the complexities in-
volved in this broad spectrum cannot be addresses here, it is evident that these revolu-
tionary perspectives share common ground in that they act to remind both realism
(international system) and rationalism (international society) of the moral imperfec-
tions to be found in the present state-centric model.73
It is important then to stress that Figure 1 reﬂects Linklater’s focus on Kant’s softer
revolutionary position and the idea of an international community. As Linklater ex-
plains, “The Kantian tradition represents the progressivist tendency in international
thought since its members believe in the existence of a latent community of humankind,
and are conﬁdent that all political actors have the capacity to replace strategic orienta-
tions with cosmopolitan political arrangements governed by dialogue and consent
rather than power and force.”74 Perhaps the best way of viewing this Kantian perspec-
tive is in terms of what humanity should move away from, rather than exactly what
humanity should move toward. For example, a Kantian commitment to humanity im-
plies that we should move away from the present Westphalian, state-centric model as
this serves the interests of states rather than the interests of humanity. Yet at the same
time there remains signiﬁcant debate among Kantians as to how societal relations
should be ordered instead.75 The point of relevance is that this perspective prioritizes
the value of humanity over the realist focus on power or the English School focus on
order.
To relate this cosmopolitan focus back to the study of genocide, it seems clear that
cosmopolitans could use the occurrence of genocide to illustrate how the present state
system is failing humanity. In so doing, cosmopolitanism poses a direct challenge to the
realist and English School dependency on states and policy makers, which further
strengthens the cosmopolitan normative claim that international relations should
progress to the point that the security of the individual is given priority over that of the
state—while acknowledging that the state has a role to play.76 By starting with the indi-
vidual rather than the state, cosmopolitans break away from the state-centric, top-down
focus embodied in both the aforementioned international system and international
society perspectives. Martin Shaw’s work on global society provides great insight here as
he explains that state-centric approaches are limited precisely because they neglect
“complex social relations which bind individuals and states.”77 Thus, Shaw invokes a
more complex formulation of international relations which seeks to understand both re-
lations between and within states, and in so doing invokes the idea of human society.78
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While not a cosmopolitan as such, Shaw’s work could be placed within the international
community framework as he claims that a new politics of global responsibility needs to
be forged that goes beyond the narrow, state-centric focus embodied in the interna-
tional system and society perspectives.79
Furthermore, it is important to stress that cosmopolitanism is not some utopian
dream; in sharp contrast, many cosmopolitan principles already exist in international
relations. For example, scholars such as Linklater and Richard Shapcott have used the
idea of harm to highlight that a “global harm narrative” has already emerged in inter-
national relations.80 The reality is that states have managed to forge a common under-
standing on a “range of matters which belong to a lower moral register than visions of
some supposedly universal conception of the good.”81 In other words, although there
is still a debate regarding what constitutes a universal good, states have come to an
understanding over what constitutes a universal bad. It is here that the crime of geno-
cide is of relevance. Although different societies have different views on what constitu-
tes harm, there is a universal consensus regarding the crime of genocide. As Shapcott
explains,
It follows that the more serious or fundamental the nature of the harm, the more
likely it is to be identiﬁed as such by people in diverse situations. Starvation is a
clearly harmful condition that is close to being both objectively identiﬁable (the
point at which life can no longer continue) and commanding of a near universal
consensus as to its harmful status. Likewise, having one’s identity, or community of
belonging, removed or destroyed (harmed), is also something that might well com-
mand such a consensus. Genocide is perhaps one value that states have agreed (in
principle) overrides national sovereignty, thus recognising a universal crime (or
harm) against communities as well as individuals.82
Both Shapcott and Linklater recognize genocide as a paradigm example of harm
and claim that the UNCG represents a cosmopolitan harm convention.83 Moreover,
they make the case that the principle of harm can be used to promote a global civilizing
process that beneﬁts not just states but humankind itself.84 Furthermore, as the state-
ment suggests, this process has already begun and should not be seen as some abstract
dream. Yes, we may live in an international society rather than an international com-
munity, but this does not mean that cosmopolitan principles do not exist within this
society and that they cannot be further institutionalized in order to help bring about an
international community.
It is the concept of humanity, therefore, that seems to represent a point of fracture
between the international society approach outlined above and the international com-
munity approach upheld by cosmopolitans. For example, leading English School scholar
Nicholas J. Wheeler has put forward a seminal text in which he claims that humanitar-
ian intervention could be legitimate if it were to prevent crimes such as genocide.85 In
contrast, William Bain claims, “It seems as though Wheeler merely invokes humanity
as a self-evident moral truth—the authority of which requires no further explanation—
which in the end cannot tell us the reasons why we should act to save strangers.”86 The
statement is signiﬁcant for it explains that in failing to justify the existence of humanity,
English School scholars such as Wheeler fail to explain why we should act to save those
targeted by crimes like genocide. In sharp contrast, cosmopolitans ask us to consider
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the Kantian understanding of humanity, which is built on the claim that human beings
are inextricably connected: “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt every-
where.”87 Again, one can see such thinking evident in the discourse; for example, Fergal
Keane’s analysis on the Rwandan Genocide led him to claim that “genocide killing in
Africa diminishes us all.”88 In so doing, Keane invokes the idea that an international
community of humankind actually exists which reﬂects his worldview. This would be
categorically rejected by realists.
To return brieﬂy to the debate set out between Melvern and Wertheim at the start
of this article, the cosmopolitan framework discussed here would ask policy makers not
to calculate the cost–beneﬁt analysis of genocide prevention based on the interests of
the state but on the interest of humanity itself. Thus, while Wertheim is correct to high-
light the difference between what is possible and what is plausible, one should not let
the focus on the latter obscure the potential for the former. From a cosmopolitan per-
spective, Wertheim’s approach places too much emphasis on the state-centric reality of
how the world is, rather than how it should be. After all, when faced with the horror of
genocide it seems perfectly acceptable to make the normative case that since states can
cooperate, they should cooperate in order to stop genocide. But again, these perspectives
stem from alternative worldviews, and it is impossible to prove (in the scientiﬁc sense)
that one is right and the other wrong as this is a matter of judgment, not science.
As with the system and society perspectives discussed above, there are, of course,
limitations and problems that need to be considered. The central concern with the
international community perspective is the value it places on the concepts of humanity,
human nature, and human essence to condemn acts such as genocide as inhuman.89
The problem with this worldview is that it is built on the assumption that humanity
and human essence exist.90 One could, for example, claim that the widespread partici-
pation of “ordinary people” in the genocidal process highlights the tragic reality that
such acts are, in fact, human.91 This somewhat profound philosophical argument was
put into context in the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities as news and images of events
began to ﬁlter through mainstream British society. After viewing a Daily Express exhibi-
tion on the horrors that took place in Belsen, one 30-year-old woman stated,
I’m afraid it didn’t make me feel anti-German; it made me feel anti-humanity.
Would the same have happened here, I wonder, if we’d had the same government?
I’ve heard some violent anti-Semitic talk which makes me think it would. I feel it’s
the fault of humanity at large, not the Germans in particular.92
The statement highlights that just as one can appeal to the idea of humanity to con-
demn the crime of genocide, one can also appeal to the crime of genocide to refute the
existence of a common humanity. Furthermore, even if realists and English School
scholars were to accept that humanity does in fact exist, they would then question how
we can realistically transform the present international system or international society
into an international community.93 While cosmopolitan scholars offer normative
claims, these problems demonstrate how this is an ongoing debate and that further
research needs to be done.
In sum, cosmopolitans would tend to accept that we do not live in an international
community; yet they uphold a commitment to cosmopolitan principles in the hope that
a community of humankind can be established. While English School scholars would
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advocate the prevention of genocide on the grounds that this is a legal duty that has to
be fulﬁlled, cosmopolitans would tend to claim that there is something bigger at stake:
humanity. Yet at the same time, the concept of humanity is problematic. Whereas scho-
lars such as Keane make the claim that genocide “diminishes us all,” realists would sim-
ply question if this is true. If it is not, what does this tell us about the concept of
humanity? If it is, how are we meant to transform the present international system into
an international community? Thus, further dialogue on this issue is essential for it may
be the case that even if humanity does not exist, this does not mean that we should not
construct it, cherish it, and protect it.94
Conclusion
This article has examined three perspectives on genocide to illustrate how one’s view of
international relations shapes one’s perception, interpretation, and understanding of
genocide within it. This is a simple yet important point. For example, genocide scholars
continually refer to the international community’s failure to prevent genocide; yet it is
clear that most IR scholars do not actually believe that an international community exists.
Therefore, when genocide scholars use the term international community they seem to
be simply repeating a political mantra which is often put forward by politicians for politi-
cal purposes.95 Through an examination of the ideas of an international system, interna-
tional society, and international community, this article revealed how alternative
worldviews embody fundamentally different understandings of cooperation, power, jus-
tice, order, human nature, and so forth, which in turn shape perceptions of genocide. In
other words, genocide is open for interpretation. This may seem somewhat shocking as
some genocide scholars might claim that all scholars, policy makers, and laypeople
should see genocide as a problem of the greatest magnitude. Yet the truth is that there is
not one interpretation of genocide. Thus, the three perspectives outlined in this article
help underline the magnitude of the task at hand as genocide prevention remains depen-
dent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.
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